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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jeffery Jeske contends the district court made several errors in his case. First, it allowed
evidence commenting on the fact that he refused to submit to a blood draw in violation of his
Fourth Amendment rights.

Second, in violation of several other of his state and federal

constitutional rights, on the morning of trial, it granted the State’s motion to amend the
information to allow it to add a new per se theory of DUI liability to the case. Third, on the
impairment theory of DUI liability the State continued to pursue, it refused to give a requested
jury instruction that the impairment must be “noticeable” or “perceptible.”

Finally, it

erroneously admitted evidence about other uncharged misconduct on a res gestae basis even
though that evidence is not admissible under I.R.E. 404(b). These errors, either independently or
cumulatively, should result in this Court vacating the judgment of conviction and remanding this
case for a new trial.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Given the number and diversity of the district court’s errors in this case, to promote
clarity, the facts relevant to the specific issues will be set forth in the respective sections of the
brief. Generally, though, Mr. Jeske was pulled over for having only one operational headlight.
(See R., p.8.) He was ultimately arrested for DUI, and a jury convicted him of that charge.
(R., pp.8, 202.) With Mr. Jeske’s agreement, the district court proceeded to hold a court trial on
Parts II and III of the Information, which both alleged enhancements based on prior convictions,
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and it found him guilty in both respects. (Tr., Vol.6, pp.8-12.)1 The district court ultimately
sentenced Mr. Jeske to a unified term of fourteen years, with seven years fixed, and retained
jurisdiction. (Tr., Vol.7, p.21, Ls.19-23.) Mr. Jeske filed a notice of appeal timely from the
judgment of conviction. (R., pp.220, 223.)

1

The transcripts in this case are provided in seven separately bound and paginated volumes. To
avoid confusion, “Vol.1” will refer to the volume containing the transcript of the motion to
suppress hearing held on June 1, 2016. “Vol.2” will refer to the volume with the transcript of the
morning-of pretrial discussions and the testimony taken on the first day of trial. “Vol.3” will
refer to the volume with the transcript of the voir dire proceedings and the opening statements.
“Vol.4” will refer to the volume containing the transcript of the second day of trial. “Vol.5” will
refer to the volume containing the transcript of the jury instructions and closing arguments.
“Vol.6” will refer to the transcript with the verdict and the subsequent court trial. “Vol.7” will
refer to the volume with the transcript of the sentencing hearing.
2

ISSUES
I.

Whether the district court allowed evidence of Mr. Jeske’s refusal to consent to a blood
draw in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and in direct contravention of clear
Idaho Supreme Court precedent.

II.

Whether the district court erred by granting the State’s motion to amend the information
on the morning of trial because doing so prejudiced Mr. Jeske’s constitutional rights to
due process and a preliminary hearing.

III.

Whether the district court erred by refusing to give the requested instruction that, to be
guilty of DUI under an impairment theory, the impairment must be “noticeable” or
“perceptible.”

IV.

Whether the district court erred when it allowed the State to present evidence of other
uncharged misconduct under a res gestae analysis since that evidence is not admissible
under the Rules of Evidence.

V.

Whether the accumulation of errors in this case requires reversal even if this Court
determines them all to be individually harmless.

3

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Allowed Evidence Of Mr. Jeske’s Refusal To Consent To A Blood Draw In
Violation Of His Fourth Amendment Rights And In Direct Contravention Of Clear Idaho
Supreme Court Precedent
A.

Relevant Facts
After Mr. Jeske had been arrested, the officer asked him if he would consent to a blood

draw. (Trial Exh. 1, Clip 1068017.)2 Mr. Jeske had already invoked his rights after the officer
advised him of his Miranda rights. (MTS Exh. 1, Clip 1068016.) As such, he simply refused to
answer the question about the blood draw and remained silent. (Trial Exh. 1, Clip 1068017.)
However, after the officer got a warrant for the blood draw, Mr. Jeske broke his silence, but only
to make it clear for the record that he was not consenting to the blood draw. (Trial Exh. 1, Clip
1068019.)
Mr. Jeske argued that, since people have a constitutional right to refuse to consent to
searches, the district court should prohibit the State from offering evidence which commented on
his refusal to consent to the blood draw. (Tr., Vol.2, p.23, Ls.13-18.) The district court denied
Mr. Jeske’s motion in that regard because, “I think there’s been a sufficient showing that the
refusal . . . to submit to a blood draw goes to the consciousness of guilt.” (Tr., Vol.2, p.24,
Ls.5-9.)
During the trial, the prosecutor engaged in the following direct examination of the
officer:

2

During the trial, the State submitted a single exhibit consisting of multiple video clips. It
submitted a similar exhibit which contained all those same clips, plus a few others, during the
hearing on Mr. Jeske’s motion to suppress. Therefore, to avoid confusion, citations to those
exhibits will be identified as either “MTS” or “Trial,” and will be accompanied by the number of
the particular video clip.
4

Q. Did you give Mr. Jeske an opportunity to conduct another test of his own free
will?
A. Yes, I asked if he was willing to provide a blood sample.
Q. Okay. Did you explain the process that you have to go through if he did not
consent to that?
A. I believe I did. I told him I needed to get a warrant from a judge.
(Tr., Vol.4, p.80, L.23 - p.81, L.4.) After that, she played the video showing Mr. Jeske refusing
to answer the question about whether he would consent to a blood draw for the jury. (Tr., Vol.4,
p.84, Ls.19-24.)

B.

The Idaho Supreme Court Has Made It Clear That Evidence Commenting On The
Defendant’s Exercise Of His Fourth Amendment Right To Not Consent To A Search
Cannot Be Admitted As Evidence Of Consciousness Of Guilt
A blood draw is a search under the Fourth Amendment of the federal constitution and

Art. I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution. Maryland v. King, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969
(2013); State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 418 (2014). Therefore, a warrant is required to conduct a
blood draw unless the State can prove that one of the relevant exceptions applies on the facts of a
particular case. See, e.g., Missouri v. McNeely, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1558 (2013);
Wulff, 157 Idaho at 418-19, 421.
Consent is one such exception, and by statute, Idaho implies consent to BAC testing from
all who drive on Idaho’s roads. See Wulff, 157 Idaho at 419. However, when a person declines
to submit or objects to a blood draw, they have withdrawn that implied consent, and thus,
invoked the protections of the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 422-23 (also acknowledging the
Legislature’s recognition of a defendant’s “physical ability to refuse to submit to an evidentiary
test”) (internal quotation and emphasis omitted). Because that refusal constitutes an invocation
of the Fourth Amendment protections, that refusal cannot be admitted as evidence of
consciousness of guilt. State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 470 (2007) (“The same rationale
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that precludes evidence of an accused’s assertion of his or her Fifth Amendment Rights offered
for the purpose of impeaching or inferring guilt precludes evidence of the accused’s assertion of
his or her Fourth Amendment rights offered for the same purpose.”)3
The district court’s reason for denying Mr. Jeske’s request to suppress that evidence is
directly contrary to Christiansen: “I think there’s been a sufficient showing that the refusal . . .
to submit to a blood draw goes to the consciousness of guilt.” (Tr., Vol.2, p.24, Ls.5-9.) Ergo,
its decision was erroneous, and the subsequent admission of that evidence commenting on
Mr. Jeske’s refusal to consent to the blood draw violated Mr. Jeske’s Fourth Amendment rights.

II.
The District Court Erred By Granting The State’s Motion To Amend The Information On The
Morning Of Trial Because Doing So Prejudiced Mr. Jeske’s Constitutional Rights To Due
Process And A Preliminary Hearing
A.

Relevant Facts
The initial complaint alleged, in relevant part:
That the defendant . . . did drive and/or was in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle on or at a street . . . while under the influence of alcohol and/or
intoxicating substance, all of which is contrary to the form, force and effect of the
statute [I.C. §§ 18-8004, 18-8005(6), 19-2514] . . . .

(R., p.46.) Mr. Jeske waived his right to a preliminary hearing on those particular allegations.
(R., p.54.)

The information, filed on February 8, 2016, made identical allegations to the

complaint. (Compare R., pp.46, 56.)
Thereafter, on February 24, 2016, the parties received results from the blood draw
performed on Mr. Jeske. (Tr., Vol.4, p.9, Ls.13-18.) However, the State continued under the

3

In fact, in Christiansen, the State conceded “the prosecutor could not have reasonably believed
that such evidence was admissible” to show consciousness of guilt. Christiansen, 244 Idaho at
470-71.
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original information until at least May 26, 2016, at which point, the prosecutor asserted she filed
a motion to amend the information.4 (See Tr., Vol.2, p.10, Ls.3-5.) In that amended information,
the prosecutor sought to add a new allegation of fact:
That the defendant . . . did drive and/or was in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle on or at a street . . . while under the influence of alcohol and/or
intoxicating substance, and/or in the alternative, did drive the above described
motor vehicle at the above described location, with an alcohol concentration of
.08 percent or more, to-wit: .0182, as shown by an analysis of his blood, all of
which is contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute [I.C. §§ 18-8004, 188005(6), 19-2514] . . . .
(R., pp.149-50 (addition indicated by underline).)
The State’s motion to amend the information was not taken up until the morning of trial.
(See R., pp.146, 152.) At that time, defense counsel argued that the proposed amendment
materially changed the nature of the charge, and so, the eleventh-hour amendment prejudiced
Mr. Jeske’s constitutional right to due process, as he did not have meaningful notice of, or
opportunity to prepare a defense to, that new theory. (Tr., Vol.2, p.9, Ls.6-12.) In making that
argument, she asserted the State had not, prior to seeking the amendment, provided the
credentials of the person who had performed the blood draw. (Tr., Vol.2, p.8, Ls.14-21 (“the
State did not provide any credentials for the witness who took the blood until just recently.”).)
She also argued that, because it alleged new facts which were not relevant to the essential
elements of the originally-charged theory, allowing the amendment would prejudice Mr. Jeske’s

4

While the prosecutor asserted she filed the amended information on May 26, 2016, the register
of actions does not show any such filing. (See generally R., p.4.) The first filing it shows in
relation to amending the information is the State’s Brief in Support of Amended Information
filed on June 2, 2016. (R., pp.4, 143.) The Amended Information itself was not file-stamped
until June 6, 2016. (R., pp.4, 149.) However, trial counsel below appeared to accept the
representation that the amended information was filed on May 26, 2016. (See Tr., Vol.2, p.8,
Ls.6-7.)
7

state constitutional and statutory right to a preliminary hearing as well.

(Tr., Vol.2, p.7,

L.5 - p.8, L.4, p.9, Ls.6-7.)
The district court allowed the late amendment on the basis that Mr. Jeske’s knowledge of
the BAC test results themselves several months prior to trial meant the amendment would not
substantially prejudice him. (Tr., Vol.2, p.12, Ls.12-14.) Ironically, a few days earlier, the
substitute district court judge who presided over the hearing on the motion to suppress had
refused to hear Mr. Jeske’s claim that the officer had misrepresented or omitted material facts in
his testimony in support of the warrant to conduct the blood draw on the basis that Mr. Jeske had
not timely raised that claim and that proceeding on that late-disclosed argument would prejudice
the State. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.12, L.7 - p.13, L.4.)

B.

Adding The Per Se Theory At The Eleventh Hour Changed The Nature Of The Offense
Charged, And So, Prejudiced Several Of Mr. Jeske’s Constitutional Rights
Due process demands that “[a] defendant before being placed upon trial for his life or

liberty is entitled to be appraised not only of the name of the offense with which he is charged,
but, in general terms, of the manner in which he is charged with having committed the offense.”5
State v. McMahan, 57 Idaho 240, ___, 65 P.2d 156, 158 (1937) (emphasis from original).
Reference to the relevant code section is usually sufficient to put the defendant on notice in this
regard, as the code section will usually identify all the essential elements of the charged offense.
See, e.g., State v. Quintero, 141 Idaho 619, 621-22 (2005). However, there is a particular group
of charges, such as theft and manslaughter, where “the crime may be committed by a multitude
of methods and conduct, [and] mere repetition of the statutory language may not be sufficient to

5

This protection is embodied in both the federal and state constitutions, as well as several state
statutes. See State v. Gumm, 99 Idaho 549, 551 (1978).

8

satisfy the pleading instrument function of notifying the defendant of the charge which must be
defendant against” in those cases.

State v. Dorsey, 139 Idaho 149, 151 (Ct. App. 2003)

(emphasis from original). When a multiple-means offense is charged, “‘[t]he facts alleged,
rather than the designation of the offense, control’” the determination of whether the charging
document gives sufficient notice of which particular theory or theories of liability are on the
table. State v. O’Neill, 118 Idaho 244, 249 (1990) (quoting State v. Mickey, 27 Idaho 626, ___,
150 P. 39, 40 (1915)).
DUI is one of this group of multiple-means offenses, as it can be committed by driving
with a BAC of more than 0.08 percent (the “per se theory”), or it can be committed when
consumption of drugs or alcohol actually affects the ability to drive (the “impairment theory”).
See, e.g., State v. Edmonson, 125 Idaho 132, 134 (Ct. App. 1994). The two theories of DUI
liability require proof of different facts. The only fact that matters in a per se prosecution is the
blood test result. State v. Tomlinson, 159 Idaho 112, 117 (Ct. App. 2015). Thus, under that
theory, “the extent of the defendant’s impairment is ‘neither an element nor a fact of
consequence in the state’s case-in-chief.’” Id. (quoting Edmonson, 125 Idaho at 135). On the
other hand, those facts are all that matter in an impairment theory prosecution, and it is the blood
test results which are irrelevant, except in the narrow circumstance where those results are
extrapolated back to the time the defendant was driving, so as to infer actual impairment.
State v. Robinett, 141 Idaho 110, 113 (2005). Therefore, a charging document which only
alleges facts relevant to one of those theories brings only that one theory into play; under such a
charging document, evidence relevant to the uncharged theory is properly suppressed.
Edmonson, 125 Idaho at 134-35 (holding, in a prosecution where the State “thus limited itself to
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proving a per se violation of the statute” in the charging document, the defendant’s evidence as
to actual impairment was properly suppressed).
In this case, the original information document only alleged facts relevant to an
impairment theory: that Mr. Jeske “was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle on or at a
street . . . while under the influence of alcohol and/or intoxicating substance.” (R., p.56.)
Having thus limited itself to proving a violation through actual impairment, the State would not
be allowed to present the irrelevant later-collected test results as direct evidence of guilt.
However, “[t]he court may permit [a charging document] to be amended at any time
before the prosecution rests if no additional or different offense is charged and if the substantial
rights of the defendant are not prejudiced.”

I.C.R. 7(e); accord I.C. § 19-1420; see

State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 709 (2009) (“[A]n amendment that merely alleges additional
means by which the defendant may have committed the crime is permissible if it does not
prejudice the defendant.”) Eleventh-hour amendments, like the one the district court allowed in
this case, are particularly problematic because “to allow an amendment and then force the
defendant to defend immediately, without allowing him to prepare against the amended
information” is prejudicial to his rights. Gumm, 99 Idaho at 552.
First, the amendment in this case prejudiced Mr. Jeske’s substantial right to due process
by depriving him of adequate notice of the manner in which he was alleged to have violated the
law and a meaningful opportunity to prepare a defense thereto. Rather, that decision, made on
the morning of trial, did precisely what the Idaho Supreme Court stated in Gumm was improperly
prejudicial – it forced Mr. Jeske to defend immediately without having time to prepare a defense
in regard to the new allegations of fact.

10

The district court’s point – that Mr. Jeske was aware of the BAC test results themselves
well in advance of trial (Tr., Vol.2, p.12, Ls.12-14) – does not change that conclusion because
whether or not he knew of the evidence itself is not the proper analysis. While it is true that “a
defendant generally cannot be prejudiced by the absence of specific details in the information
when those details are known to the defendant or provided to him by means other than the
information,” State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 41, 46-47 (Ct. App. 2003), the specific details of which
the defendant must be apprised to meet the requirements of due process are, and always have
been, that the defendant be made aware that the State intends to use that evidence against him.
See McMahan, 65 P.2d at 159-60 (“Without knowledge as to the nature of the charge upon
which he has to be tried, he could not [prepare his defense].”); cf. State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho
225, 230 (2007) (acknowledging this same notice requirement in the similar context of admission
of evidence under I.R.E. 404(b)).
In this case, for example, defense counsel asserted that the State had not disclosed the
credentials of the person who drew the blood until it moved to amend the charge. (Tr., Vol.2,
p.8, Ls.14-21.) As such, there was no indication the State would be able to lay the foundation to
introduce that evidence per I.C. § 18-8003(1).6 Furthermore, by the time the State filed its

6

As defense counsel’s argument suggests, there may have been other arguments as to that
person’s qualifications which could have been made had adequate notice been given.
(Tr., Vol.2, p.8, Ls.14-21.) For example, there is a question as to whether the State met its
discovery obligations under I.C.R. 16(b)(6). (See Tr., Vol.2, p.11, Ls.2-13 (the prosecutor
arguing that, because that person’s name was in the police reports, and the defense might have
been able to get her qualifications from her employer, there was no prejudice in regard to the late
disclosure of those qualifications).) However, the lateness of the motion to amend the
information, (which is what made all this evidence relevant, and thus, this sort of decision
necessary), left the district court in a position where it had to make decisions in that regard on the
fly, and that further shows the prejudice to Mr. Jeske’s rights. Compare Sheldon, 145 Idaho at
230 (noting that similar problems with the State’s notice of intent to use evidence under
I.R.E. 404(b) meant the notice requirement was not met, and so, the evidence was inadmissible).
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motion to amend the information, Mr. Jeske had already filed his motion to suppress and brief in
support, in which he raised arguments in relation to whether he actually appeared intoxicated.
(See generally R., pp.68-70; Aug. pp.1-2.)7 The State did not argue the BAC test results, either
directly or by extrapolating back, in its responses to Mr. Jeske’s arguments in that regard.
(See generally R., pp.121-32; Tr., Vol.1.) Therefore, prior to actually amending the information,
the State gave no indication that it intended to use the BAC test results against Mr. Jeske,
particularly under a per se theory of liability. Since Mr. Jeske was not given notice of that
critical fact, he had no reason to believe he needed to prepare a defense on that front. As a result,
despite the fact that he knew about the BAC test results themselves, allowing the State to use that
evidence against him under a new theory of liability on the morning of trial prejudiced his due
process rights. Compare State v. Naranjo, 152 Idaho 134, 142 (Ct. App. 2011) (finding this
same prejudice in the I.R.E. 404(b) context).
Second, allowing the late amendment prejudiced Mr. Jeske’s state constitutional and
statutory right to a preliminary hearing on those new facts and new theory of liability.
(Tr., Vol.2, p.7, Ls.15-25.)

When an information is “subsequently amended charging a

defendant with a crime of a greater degree or of a different nature than that for which he or she
was held by the committing magistrate, the defendant is denied his or her constitutional and
statutory right to a preliminary hearing and the trial court is consequently without jurisdiction.”8
State v. Palmer, 138 Idaho 931, 936 (Ct. App. 2003) (emphasis added). Because the per se
theory changes the nature of the offense, a new preliminary hearing was required on those new

7

A motion to augment the record with a copy of the motion to suppress has been filed
contemporaneously with this brief.
8
“Since the indictment or information provides subject matter jurisdiction to the court, the
court’s jurisdictional power depends on the charging document being legally sufficient to survive
challenge.” State v. Schmierer, 159 Idaho 768, ___, 367 P.3d 163, 165 (2016).
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allegations. That hearing would, in fact, give Mr. Jeske the requisite notice, as well as an
opportunity to develop his defense (through, for example, cross-examination of the State’s
witnesses) as to the elements of the new theory of prosecution. See Jones, 140 Idaho at 46-47
(“The preliminary hearing eliminated any uncertainty and gave Jones notice of the details of the
charges against him.”). Without that, however, this case falls under the rule in Palmer, and the
late amendment which changed the nature of the charge prejudiced Mr. Jeske’s substantial right
to a preliminary hearing.
Because the late amendment prejudiced several of Mr. Jeske’s substantial, constitutional
rights, it should not have been allowed. Therefore, the district court erred when, on the morning
of trial, it allowed the State to amend the charge to add the per se theory to the Information.

III.
The District Court Erred By Refusing To Give The Requested Instruction That, To Be Guilty Of
DUI Under An Impairment Theory, The Impairment Must Be “Noticeable” Or “Perceptible”

A.

Relevant Facts
Prior to trial, defense counsel requested, in regard to the impairment theory, that the

district court instruct the jury: “To prove that someone was under the influence of alcohol, . . .
[t]he influence must be noticeable or perceptible and impair a physical or mental function that
relates to one’s ability to drive.” (R., p.138.) Mr. Jeske renewed that request at the close of
evidence. (Tr., Vol.4, p.156, Ls.14-17.) The district court denied that request because that
instruction was not part of the pattern jury instructions. (See Tr., Vol.4, p.57, Ls.1-11.)
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B.

Just Because It Is Not Included In The Pattern Jury Instruction Does Not Mean The
Requested Instruction Was Not A Proper Statement Of The Law Which Needed To Be
Given Because Of The Facts Of This Case
While the pattern jury instructions are presumptively correct, the district courts are to

adapt them if another instruction “would more adequately, accurately, or clearly state the law.”
State v. Reid, 151 Idaho 80, 85 (Ct. App. 2011); accord Introduction and General Directions for
Use [of the Pattern Instructions], available at https://isc.idaho.gov/main/criminal-juryinstructions. Thus, “a requested instruction must be given if: (1) it properly states the governing
law; (2) a reasonable view of at least some evidence would support the defendant’s legal theory;
(3) the subject of the requested instruction is not adequately addressed by other jury instructions;
and (4) the requested instruction does not constitute an impermissible comment as to the
evidence.”

State v. Macias, 142 Idaho 509, 510 (Ct. App. 2005) (emphasis added); see

State v. Thomasson, 122 Idaho 172, 175 (1992) (holding that, if “there is a reasonable view of
the evidence to support an instruction on the lesser included offense, then it must instruct the jury
on that lesser included offense”) (emphasis from original).
First, the requested instruction properly states the governing law:

“this Court has

previously defined what it means to be under the influence in Idaho, and it includes impairment
of driving ability to the slightest degree; the impairment must be noticeable and perceptible, but
does not need to rise to the level where the defendant is incapable of driving safely or prudently.”
State v. Schmoll, 144 Idaho 800, 804 (Ct. App. 2007) (emphasis added); accord State v. Andrus,
118 Idaho 711, 714-15 (Ct. App. 1990).
Second, a reasonable view of some of the evidence supported the requested instruction.
Specifically, that evidence is provided by the video clips the State admitted at trial which could
reasonably be seen to show no perceptible intoxication.
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For example, Trial Exh. 1, Clip

1067904, which shows the initial traffic stop, shows no irregular driving patterns, such as
swerving or speeding. Additionally, the district court made several factual findings about what
the video from the officer’s body camera (MTS Exh.1, Clip 1068014), which was admitted at
trial, shows or does not show about Mr. Jeske’s appearance and demeanor during the hearing on
the motion to suppress.9 For example, Mr. Jeske did not react inappropriately when the officer
informed him of the purpose for the stop. (Tr., Vol.1, p.62, Ls.1-2.) There was no “bizarre”
behavior; just some idiosyncratic behaviors which were indicative of nothing. (Tr., Vol.1, p.63,
Ls.17-22.) The video did not show Mr. Jeske as unable to focus on the officer while being
questioned, nor did it show him having a “thousand-yard stare.” (Tr., Vol.1, p.64, Ls.3-8.)
Mr. Jeske’s speech, while slurred at times, was also clear at times. (Tr., Vol.1, p.63, L.24 - p.64,
L.2.) The video did not show him as having lethargic or relaxed facial muscles. (Tr., Vol.1,
p.64, Ls.9-16.) The video did not show Mr. Jeske swaying on his feet. (Tr., Vol.1, p.67, Ls.3-8.)
Those findings all would support the position that Mr. Jeske was not noticeably or perceptibly
impaired.
Third, the subject of the requested instruction was not adequately addressed in the other
instructions. While it is true that the Court of Appeals has held this sort of instruction is not
mandatory, it also indicated there may be cases when such a clarification is nevertheless
necessary. State v. Lewis, 126 Idaho 282, 285 (Ct. App. 1994); see also Reid, 151 Idaho at 86
(indicating that the court should give additional instructions if it would more adequately and
accurately state the law). In such cases, “We recommend that if an adjective phrase be used to

9

To the extent the officer testified to the contrary of those factual findings, the district court’s
findings simply reveal that the jury could, as the district court did, reasonably conclude the
officer’s testimony is not credible in light of the video evidence.
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describe the degree of impairment required, it be that the impairment is noticeable and
perceptible.” Lewis, 126 Idaho at 285.
This was the focal point of contention under the impairment theory, as demonstrated by
defense counsel’s closing argument on that issue:

“Where is the evidence that he was

intoxicated, that he was unable to properly drive that vehicle? He was not under the influence.
The evidence shows that.” (Tr., Vol.5, p.21, Ls.13-16.) This is a particularly important point in
this case due to the dual nature of the State’s case. Because of the per se theory, the jurors were
aware that Mr. Jeske in fact had an intoxicating substance (alcohol) in his system. That means
the impairment theory turned precisely on the determination of the degree of impairment due to
that substance. Thus, unlike the general cases acknowledged in Lewis, the other instructions in
this case did not adequately address the issue of degree of impairment that the requested
instruction would discuss.
Fourth, the requested instruction was not a comment on the evidence. It left the question
of whether the impairment was noticeable or perceptible to the jurors’ determination. Since the
requested instruction was a proper statement of the law and because it was necessary to
accurately and fairly instruct the jury on the law relevant to its decision given the facts presented,
the district court erred by refusing to give that instruction.

IV.
The District Court Erred When It Allowed The State To Present Evidence Of Other Uncharged
Misconduct Under A Res Gestae Analysis Since That Evidence Is Not Admissible Under The
Rules Of Evidence
A.

Relevant Facts
When she received and reviewed the version of the video exhibit the State intended to use

at trial, defense counsel argued that it contained improper evidence of other uncharged
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misconduct, namely, Mr. Jeske’s failure to purchase a driver’s license.10 (Tr., Vol.2, p.14,
Ls.5-10.) When the officer had asked him about that, Mr. Jeske had made a hand gesture
indicating it was simply due to monetary reasons. (Tr., Vol.2, p.18, Ls.17-18.) The State argued
that evidence was relevant to Mr. Jeske’s identity, that it was too intertwined with the other
issues in the case, and that it was not prejudicial. (Tr., Vol.2, p.18, Ls.1-24.) The district court
ultimately decided: “the response is not prejudicial. Mr. Jeske did not give a reason, such as he
had a suspended license, you know, for other reasons, and I do find that it is sufficiently
intertwined with other issues that it would be -- that it also goes to reasonable suspicion and
probable cause.” (Tr., Vol.2, p.24, Ls.10-17.)

B.

The District Court’s Analysis On This Issue Is Irreconcilable With The Idaho Supreme
Court’s Recent Decision In State v. Kralovec, And That Evidence Is Inadmissible Under
The Proper Analysis
The district court’s analysis – that the discussion about Mr. Jeske’s driver’s license was

so intertwined with the other issues in the case that it had to be admitted – is a res gestae
analysis. 11 However, the Idaho Supreme Court recently made it clear that sort of analysis is
improper: “we decline to perpetuate the use of the res gestae doctrine in Idaho,” and so, it will
not justify the admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence; rather, the Rules of Evidence

10

The district court initially expressed concern as to why this motion was brought on the
morning of trial, but after defense counsel explained that the trial version of the video exhibit had
only been provided the previous Friday, the district court withdrew those concerns. (See
Tr., Vol.2, p.15, L.22 - p.16, L.12, p.19, L.23 - p.20, L.4.)
11
Res gestae was originally meant to allow for admission of statements which accompanied
material acts in contexts which are now addressed by the hearsay rules. Id. at 587. However, it
evolved into a justification for admitting evidence of “other acts that occur during the
commission of or in close temporal proximity to the charged offense which must be described to
‘complete the story of the crime by placing it in the context of nearby and nearly
contemporaneous happenings.” Kralovec, 388 P.3d at 587 (internal quotation omitted).
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control whether evidence is admissible. State v. Kralovec, 161 Idaho 569, ____, 388 P.3d 583,
587-88 (2017).
The evidence of the other uncharged misconduct in this case – Mr. Jeske’s failure to
purchase a driver’s license – is inadmissible under I.R.E. 404(b).

That rule requires that

evidence of other bad acts must be relevant to some non-propensity purpose, and that the
prejudice caused by its admission does not substantially outweigh its probative value before it
can be admitted. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 (2009).
Under the first step of that analysis, non-propensity purposes are things like the
defendant’s knowledge, intent, motive, plan, or absence of mistake or accident. Id. at 54. The
State argued that the driver’s license evidence was relevant to Mr. Jeske’s identity. (Tr., Vol.2,
p.18, Ls.1-24.) However, Mr. Jeske’s identity as the driver of the car was never in dispute.
(See generally R., Tr.) Therefore, that is not a valid basis to make the other bad acts evidence
admissible. Grist, 147 Idaho at 52 (clarifying that the other bad acts evidence “must be relevant
to a material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged”) (emphasis added).
The district court, on the other hand, decided the driver’s license evidence was relevant to
reasonable suspicion and probable cause. (Tr., Vol.2, p.24, Ls.16-17.) However, neither of
those are questions for the jury, and so, they are not material issues to the criminal charge.
Grist, 147 Idaho at 52. Rather, that is simply a further iteration of its improper res gestae
analysis – that it is relevant to complete the story by putting it in context of other
contemporaneous happenings.
The district court also determined the driver’s license evidence was relevant because
Mr. Jeske did not offer an alternative explanation for why his license was suspended.
(Tr., Vol.2, p.24, Ls.12-14.) First, that improperly flips the burden of proof. As the proponent of
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the evidence, the State has the burden to show there is a non-propensity basis for admitting the
evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Urena, 844 F.3d 681, 684 (7th Cir. 2016) (expressly stating
the burdens in regard to F.R.E. 404(b)); Grist, 147 Idaho at 52 n.2 (noting that I.R.E. 404(b) is
“substantially identical to F.R.E. 404(b)”).

Therefore, Mr. Jeske did not have to offer an

alternative explanation for why his license was invalid.
Besides, the alternative explanation the district court discussed is still only relevant for
propensity purposes – that Mr. Jeske disregarded the rules regarding driving with a valid license,
and so, he must also have disregarded the rules about driving after drinking. Nothing about the
status of his driver’s license, for whatever reason it is invalid, makes any of the material,
disputed elements of the DUI charge more or less probable. See Grist, 147 Idaho at 52. Since
there is no non-propensity basis for the admission of the driver’s license evidence, it should have
been suppressed on the first level of the I.R.E. 404(b) analysis.
Furthermore, the danger of undue prejudice substantially outweighs the non-existent
probative value of that evidence. The risk is that the jurors, who were also shown various video
clips of Mr. Jeske refusing to take statutorily-required evidentiary tests, would use the driver’s
license evidence to convict him based on his character for disregarding rules rather than a
determination of whether he was actually under the influence under either theory the State was
pursuing.
Therefore, since the district court used the wrong analysis to admit the driver’s license
evidence, and since that evidence is not admissible under the proper analysis, the district court
erred when it allowed the State to present the evidence of the other uncharged misconduct in
regard to the invalid status of Mr. Jeske’s driver’s license.
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V.
The Accumulation Of Errors In This Case Requires Reversal Even If This Court Determines
Them All To Be Individually Harmless
Even if this Court determines that each of the errors discussed supra was harmless by
itself, this Court should still vacate Mr. Jeske’s convictions under the cumulative-error doctrine.
See, e.g., State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 572-73 (2007). The accumulation of independentlyharmless errors may still deprive the defendant of his right to a fair trial. Id. In order to find
cumulative error, the appellate court must first find more than one instance of error.
State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 287 (2003).

To prove the accumulated errors harmless, the

State would have to show that the guilty verdict rendered in this case was surely unattributable to
the cumulative effect of the errors. See State v. Whitaker, 152 Idaho 945, 953 (Ct. App. 2012);
see also Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993) (articulating the proper test for harmless
error); State v. Thomas, 157 Idaho 919 (2014) (reaffirming the application of the Sullivan test in
Idaho).
In this case, there are several instances of error, and there is a reasonable possibility that
the accumulation of errors contributed to Mr. Jeske’s conviction. As a result, even if all those
errors are found to be independently harmless, this Court should still vacate the judgment of
conviction and remand this case for a new trial because the accumulated errors deprived
Mr. Jeske of his right to a fair trial.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Jeske respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgment of conviction and
remand this case for a new trial.
DATED this 2nd day of June, 2017.

__________/s/_______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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